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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of foreign versus domestic ownership in reducing the 
debt levels of acquired firms in Italy and Spain over the period 2002-2010. 
Acknowledging that lower debt levels can mitigate the risk of failure and thus 
enhance the chances for a positive post-acquisition performance and survival, we 
particularly examine the causal effect of foreign and domestic acquisitions on two 
firm-level debt measures: gearing and short-term leverage. To estimate causal 
relationships, we control for selection bias by applying propensity score matching 
techniques. Our results indicate that foreign acquisition leads to a significant and 
steady reduction in the debt ratios of the target companies. In contrast, the 
relationship between domestic acquisition and debt reduction appears to be smaller 
and statistically less robust. 
 
Keywords: debt ratios; capital structure; acquisitions; foreign investment 
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1. Introduction  
 
In the current paper, we examine the influence of foreign ownership on debt reduction of 
acquisition targets. While the extant literature is rather restricted to the implications of 
foreign ownership on profitability, we focus instead on the changes in debt ratios of a target 
company after a takeover deal. Since, debt ratios have long been identified as predictors of 
failure (when increased) (Beaver, 1966; Leland, 1998; Graham and Rogers, 2002), 
identifying the role of foreign ownership in reducing these ratios, and hence increasing the 
chances of survival of the new entity after the deal, is adding one vital piece to the post-
acquisition performance puzzle. 
 
The impact of foreign ownership on performance has been in the forefront of the 
international business and finance literature for several decades. Yet, findings remain 
inconclusive. There is an abundance of evidence supporting the superiority of foreign-owned 
firms over their domestic counterparts (Boardman et al., 1997, Douma et al., 2006, 
Gedajlovic, 1993). From a resource based view, firms owned by foreign firms, typically large 
ones, can benefit from firm-specific advantages of the parent company, -- i.e. technological 
expertise, networking, access to capital etc. -- which can positively influence firm 
performance (Aybar and Ficici, 2009, Douma et al., 2006, Dunning, 1998). From an agency 
point of view, foreign firms are assumed to be better monitored and controlled, presenting an 
overall more robust financial performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000). Nevertheless, industry and country specific factors (Barbosa and Louri, 
2005, Globerman et al., 1994), high agency costs (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) and 
institutional factors (Heugens et al., 2009) have been reported to offset the benefits of foreign 
ownership. 
 
The rich extant literature on cross-border acquisitions is equally convoluting. On one hand, 
several studies on cross-border takeover deals have found a positive impact of foreign 
ownership on performance associated with firm-specific advantages of the foreign acquirer 
(Li et al., 2015, Markides and Ittner, 1994, Ning et al., 2014). On the other hand, there is 
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overwhelming evidence suggesting that acquisition deals do not manage to create shareholder 
value, but rather destroy it (Agrawal et al, 1992, Aw and Chatterjee, 2004, Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2008, Craninckx and Huyghebaert, 2011).3  
 
From the above, it is easy to discern that, as long as the literature is restricted to the direct 
implications of foreign ownership on profitability, a consensus regarding the role of foreign 
ownership on post-takeover performance cannot be reached. Nevertheless, with the 7th global 
Merger Wave4 well under way, it is imperative to better understand not only the direct but 
also the indirect implications of foreign acquisitions on performance. So far we know that a 
reduction in debt levels minimizes the risk of failure and thus enhances the chances for a 
positive post-acquisition performance and survival. Meanwhile, foreign ownership has been 
long associated with better performance (Boardman et al., 1997, Douma et al., 2006, Heugens 
et al., 2009), and even lower financial risk (Fatemi, 1984, Michel and Shaked, 1986). Yet, we 
are still unclear on whether foreign ownership has in fact a direct impact on the debt levels of 
acquired companies. To our knowledge, none of the former studies have explicitly factored 
in the impact of foreign ownership on debt reduction.    
 
Our study contributes to the international business literature in three distinct ways. First, we 
inform the international business audience of the changes associated with foreign ownership 
on debt levels of acquired firms after a takeover deal. We particularly examine the causal 
effect of acquisitions on two firm-level debt ratios: gearing (short and long term debt to 
shareholders funds ratio) and short-term leverage (short term debt to total assets ratio). 
Second, while most empirical studies have concentrated on the acquirer’s performance 
(Haleblian et al., 2009), we offer specific insights on the impact for the target company after 
the deal. The few studies on target firms have clearly shown significant differences on 
performance that cannot be ignored (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). At the same time, the 
survival of a target firm is paramount for both the acquirer (as a parent company) and the 
economy in which it operates (Haskel et al., 2007, O’Donnell and Blumentritt, 1999, Rugman 
et al., 2011). Third, we compare matching samples of both domestic and foreign acquired 
																																																								3	Business correspondents in the Financial Times (FT) and other business magazines are also expressing serious 
concerns for the increasing record failures of acquisition deals (i.e. Massoudi, 2014, FT). 
4 …starting in 2011, as a consequence of the rise of the big emerging countries (BRICs). 
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firms,5 which allows us to isolate the effect of foreign ownership and measure it with a higher 
degree of confidence.  
 
Finally, acknowledging the significance of the institutional context on the ownership-
performance/debt relationship (Heugens et al., 2009), specifically in bank-based economies 
(Krozner and Strahan, 2001), we focus on two of the largest bank-based economies, namely 
Italy and Spain. Domestic firms in the two countries, being characterized by an overreliance 
on bank credit and a restricted financing availability, offer an ideal setting for our study. By 
achieving a better appreciation of the factors leading to lower debt ratios for the Italian and 
Spanish firms, we open the ground for new context-specific theory development with 
significant managerial and policy implications.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses in more detail how our contribution is 
related to previous studies. Specifically, we bring together two strands of the literature to 
inform our discussion: the literature on foreign ownership and performance and the literature 
on debt, risk and performance. Section 3 outlines the empirical model specification and 
describes the data, whereas Section 4 reports the empirical results and investigates their 
robustness. Section 5 provides conclusions and further implications, and, finally, Section 6 
discusses limitations and suggests directions for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
2.1. Foreign versus Domestic Ownership and Performance 
 
An extensive number of scholars from different strands of the literature have been involved 
in deciphering the impact of foreign ownership on performance. Despite the voluminous 
studies, findings are still inconclusive, with empirical studies depicting both positive and 
negative relationships.  
 
From a resource based view, foreign ownership has been early associated with positive 
performance, as a result of ownership-specific advantages bestowed to foreign owners. 
Technological expertise and specialized production processes, superior management and 																																																								5	Very few past studies have explicitly compared foreign and domestic acquisitions (see, for example, Arnold 
and Javorcik, 2009).	
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marketing capabilities, and access to financial and human capital are only some of these key 
advantages identified (Caves, 1996, Douma et al., 2006, Dunning, 1998). When effectively 
deployed in a foreign market, these advantages help their proprietors exploit host market 
imperfections, and overcome transaction costs, the liability of foreignness and other barriers 
of internationalization (Barbosa and Louri, 2005, Dunning, 1998, Harris and Robinson, 2003, 
Markides and Ittner, 1994). Indeed, several empirical studies have provided evidence for the 
superiority of foreign firms over their domestic counterparts6 (Boardman et al., 1997, Caves, 
1996, Douma et al., 2006, Gedajlovic, 1993, Heugens et al., 2009). Moreover, foreign 
ownership has been associated with higher overall productivity (Harris and Robinson, 2003), 
and greater firm resistance to domestic demand contractions (Varum et al., 2014). 
 
Nevertheless, from an agency point of view, foreign corporate ownership has been associated 
with both positive and negative effects: the benefits and costs associated with higher control. 
Foreign ownership has been known to enhance managerial control and hence shareholder 
protection, especially in the presence of institutional voids (Heugens et al., 2009). By 
exhibiting higher concentration of share ownership, corporate foreign owners, such as large 
multinationals, can “set and effectively impose control mechanisms that maximize 
performance” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 17), leading to the dominance of foreign- over 
domestically-owned companies (Boardman and Vining, 1989, Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). 
Yet, the imposition of high control mechanisms has been known to increase transaction costs, 
which, coupled with tunneling effects and minority shareholder expropriation, can impose 
serious negative performance effects (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001, Heugens et al., 2009).  
 
2.1.1. Insights from the acquisition literature 
 
Acknowledging that cross-border acquisition is an important entry strategy for 
internationalization (Dunning, 1998, Li et al., 2015), the cross-border acquisition literature 
has contributed significantly to the foreign ownership – performance relationship debate. On 																																																								6	 A number of empirical studies have corroborated the dominance of foreign firms over the domestic ones. For 
example, Willmore (1986) analyze a matched sample of foreign and domestic firms in Brazil and find foreign 
firms to have higher productivity and greater capital intensity. Similarly, Boardman et al. (1997), using data 
from the largest 500 non-financial Canadian businesses, reveal a clear performance dominance of 
multinational firms over the domestic ones. Even studies offering contrasting evidence, such as those by 
Globerman et al. (1994) and Barbosa and Louri (2005), have to control for size to allow for any variations in 
their findings, suggesting that foreign companies tend to be much larger than their domestic counterparts, 
skewing the results in their favor.	
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one hand, cross-border deals have long been accredited a higher impact on performance than 
domestic ones, due to expectations of synergistic gains associated with the firm-specific 
advantages brought into the host-market by the foreign acquirers (Aybar and Ficici, 2009, 
Doukas and Travlos, 1988, Douma et al., 2006, Li et al., 2015, Markides and Ittner, 1994). 
To this end, a firm’s foreign-acquisition announcement can be viewed by the market as a 
signal “to transfer or expand a firm's resources internationally that will enable the firm to 
exploit uniquely international distortions in capital markets” (Doukas and Travlos, 1988: 
1162).  
 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence offers a diverse picture. It is actually a well-known fact that 
most acquisition deals do not manage to create shareholder value but rather destroy value 
(Agrawal et al, 1992, Aw and Chatterjee, 2004, Martynova and Renneboog, 2008, Craninckx 
and Huyghebaert, 2011). Similar evidence is also found among the cross-border acquisition 
deals (Aybar and Ficici, 2009). The negative-diversification discount hypothesis,7 agency 
costs, liability of foreignness, lack of experience in acquisitions, and information 
asymmetries are some of the key explanations provided to justify the negative performance 
effects (Aybar and Ficici, 2009, Doukas and Travlos, 1988). Additionally, factors such as the 
industry relevance and unique institutional factors have been found to play an important role, 
complicating the cross-border acquisition - performance relationship (Bertrand and 
Betschinger, 2012, Li et al., 2015).  
 
It is important to note here that the majority of prior empirical studies has focused on the 
acquirer’s performance rather than the performance of target firms (Haleblian et al., 2009). 
Yet, the few studies that have focused on target firms, have found their returns to be higher 
than those achieved by the bidders (acquirers), particularly in the short-term. While in the 
short-term acquirers tend to lose wealth from an acquisition deal, the target companies do 
better -- although lose in the long-term (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Hijzen et al. (2013) 
consider changes of ownership from foreign to domestic and from domestic to foreign in five 
countries; they show that only the latter are associated with a large positive wage premium, 
driven by the creation of high-skilled jobs. 
 																																																								
7 In efficient market conditions, the announcement of a foreign acquisition should have a negative signal, 
denoting the inability of the firm to further utilize its resources internally. This, coupled with the high agency 
costs of monitoring cross border activities, should have an overall negative effect on performance.  
8 	
Clearly, a consensus is yet to be reached regarding the overall cross-border acquisition - 
performance relationship (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008), particularly since performance 
has only been measured in terms of profitability, sales growth, or market power (Aybar and 
Ficici, 2009, Doukas and Travlos, 1988, Markides and Ittner, 1994, von Eije and Wiegerinck, 
2010). However, the few studies that have explored the impact of cross-border acquisitions 
on wider performance measures, such as productivity, operational profitability or market 
value (Boardman et al., 1997, Ning et al., 2014) have presented, in most cases, contrasting 
results. It is therefore imperative to look beyond the profitability related measures to fully 
appreciate the role of foreign ownership on performance. Early studies in finance have 
suggested that foreign ownership can lead to lower financial risk and as such higher 
performance (Fatemi, 1984, Michel and Shaked, 1986), 8  but offer little insights on the 
implications of foreign ownership on debt specifically. In fact, there is scarce discourse on 
the impact of foreign ownership on changes in debt levels despite the significance of this 
issue for firm growth and survival. To this end, we revert for inspiration to the substantial 
literature within international business and finance that has long explored the negative 
implications of high debt on the growth and survival of firms. 
 
2.2. The Role of Debt on Performance and Risk 
 
It is well acknowledged that optimal capital structure is the result of a trade-off between 
benefits and costs associated with debt (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). According to the 
agency theory, higher levels of debt, compared to equity, are expected to reduce agency costs 
by aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders (Harris and Raviv, 1991, 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, debt financing can lead to significant tax savings, 
with positive effects on firm performance (Graham, 2000). Nevertheless, high debt also 
increases the risk of financial distress and raises the direct and indirect costs associated with 
bankruptcy. Greater leverage increases the threat of liquidation, causing personal losses to 
managers in terms of salaries and reputation (Grossman and Hart, 1982), whilst increases 
pressure on managers to generate the cash flow required to pay interest expenses (Jensen, 
1986). At higher levels of leverage, additional debt can result into precarious increases in 
																																																								
8	Michel and Shaked (1986) report that domestic corporations are significantly less capitalized and have higher 
systematic and total risks relative to multinationals. Fatemi (1984) claims that foreign owners provide 
shareholders with risk-return opportunities, superior to those provided by domestic firms. 
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agency costs to compensate debt holders for facing a higher financial risk (Berger and Di 
Patti, 2006).  
 
High level of leverage may further limit the capacity of a firm to engage in valuable 
investment opportunities (Myers, 1977), or even force them towards riskier decisions. On one 
hand, the stakeholder theory warns that more leveraged firms have a tendency to invest in 
sub-optimal projects, at least in the long-term, expropriating short-term wealth from the 
firm’s stockholders (Galai and Masulis, 1976, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Titman and 
Wessels, 1988). On the other hand, highly-leveraged firms are driven towards riskier projects 
with the expectation of higher potential profits, despite the costs to their overall credit and 
default risk (Wiseman and Catanach, 1997). It is hence not surprising that an increase in 
leverage has a direct effect on a firm’s risk profile and consequently its market rating 
(Molina, 2005). A double increase in a firm’s leverage ratio is construed as an increase in the 
firm’s default probability, and its subsequent downgrade (Graham, 2000). 
 
In conditions of heightened financial distress, the leverage – default relationship is further 
amplified. Highly leveraged firms tend to be less efficient, which under constraints, can have 
detrimental effects on performance. Indeed, Opler and Titman (1994) -- among others -- find 
that in conditions of industrial distress, highly leveraged firms experience higher losses in 
market share, lower levels of stock returns and higher sensitivity in stock price changes that 
can hamper their overall performance. As a result, the probability of bankruptcy among 
highly leveraged firms is doubled when compared to less leveraged firms (Opler and Titman, 
1994). A firm’s bankruptcy risks impose costs (e.g. switching costs) on its stakeholders in 
case of liquidation. Customers and suppliers are unwilling to engage in relation specific 
investments with a firm facing significant bankruptcy risks, whereas reduction in human 
capital investment (Jaggia and Thakor, 1994) can lead to negative impact on total firm value, 
given the importance of human capital for competitiveness (Pfeffer, 1994).  
 
2.3. The Effect of the Institutional Environment 
 
The importance of the institutional context on the ownership-performance/debt relationship 
has early been established. Different measurements of leverage, different systems (i.e. bank-
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based versus market-based systems9, tax and bankruptcy laws, opportunities available to 
borrowers and investors etc.), as well as different levels of development (emerging versus 
developed) among countries are known to alter the underlying relationships and the 
performance effects (Rajan and Zingales, 1995, Heugens et al., 2009). For example, Heugens 
et al. (2009) report that there is a certain threshold of institutional development for ownership 
concentration (typical among foreign-owned firms) to be effective, but where it is effective, 
foreign-owned firms dominate their domestic counterparts.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the importance of the context, extant research on the foreign ownership 
– performance relationship has been rather segmented to large market-based economies, such 
as the USA and the UK. However, bank-based economies present distinctive individualities 
compared to the market-based ones that cannot be simply ignored. Bank-based economies are 
typically heavily relying on concentrated bank ownership of the debt and equity capital, and a 
closely monitored management team. Consequently, in these economies, banks have a strong 
voice in corporate governance, and they are actively involved in any investment decisions 
within the country 10  (Krozner and Strahan, 2001), even in the decision of a takeover. 
Compared to market-based economies, empirical evidence actually finds bank-based systems 
lacking in efficiency at allocating capital, managing risks and encouraging governance, 
compared to market-based financial systems (see Levine, 2002, Holmström and Tirole, 1993, 
Hillier et al., 2011). In such conditions, the presence of foreign investors -- acting as market 
substitutes -- may be central to the overall market growth. To this end, we take here a look at 
two of the largest bank-based economies in the world, Italy and Spain, to gain a better 
appreciation of the foreign ownership – performance/debt relationship under this distinct 
context. 
 
2.3.1.  The individualities of the Italian and Spanish economies 
 
Understanding the role of acquisition activities in the evolution of debt ratios is particularly 
important for local firms and the national economy in Italy and Spain for reasons that go 
beyond the type of the financial system.  																																																								
9  A standard indicator to classify economies into bank-based and market-based is the ratio of domestic bank 
credit to market capitalization (Levine, 2002); for example, a country with a high value of this indicator is 
considered to be bank-based.  
10  In Germany for example, CEOs are forbidden from serving on their supervisory boards; hence 
communication with shareholders is achieved through a board controlled by bankers (Krozner and Strahan, 
2001).	
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Compared to other large bank-based economies, Italy and Spain have less developed stock 
and private equity markets,11 which results in banks being particularly important for the 
financing of firms operating in the two countries. For instance, in 2010, bank lending to firms 
in Italy and Spain was equal to 57 and 86 percent of GDP, respectively, compared to 36 per 
cent in Germany (De Bonis et al., 2012). Italy and Spain also exhibit a poor performance in 
terms of productivity growth,12 which can be explained by the relatively small firm size in the 
two countries. More precisely, Italy and Spain have a much larger share of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) than the USA, the UK, Germany or France, which tend to 
be less productive than larger firms (Balconi, 2015). Furthermore, unlike large enterprises, 
which may turn to the capital markets, SMEs rely mostly on bank loans for funding, as a 
result of their organizational features and business strategies that are rarely publicly disclosed 
(Kaya, 2014). Hence, the central role of banks in firm financing and the overwhelming large 
share of SMEs in Italy and Spain make domestic firms in the two countries particularly 
vulnerable to macro-economic shocks and changes in bank credit.   
 
The above observations are confirmed when looking at debt developments over the period 
2000-2010. As shown in Figure 1, of the five largest Eurozone countries, the debt to financial 
assets ratios of non-financial corporations increased mostly in Italy and Spain. In all 
countries, non-financial corporations’ debt declined in 2009 -- though to a lesser extent in 
Italy and Spain. As reported by ECB (2012), this can be explained by debt deleveraging: as a 
reaction to changing conditions in bank credit after the crisis, firms may have increased their 
efforts to deleverage in order to secure or improve their creditworthiness, and these efforts 
may have been stronger for large firms than for SMEs (which dominate the Italian and 
Spanish economies) due to wider financing options. 
 
---- Insert Figure 1 here ---- 
 
 																																																								
11  As stated by De Bonis et al. (2012), the underdevelopment of the financial markets in Italy can be 
attributed to the country’s historical legacy and a number of other factors, such as the dominance of family 
controlling firms, which tend to keep outside shareholders away, the prevalence of the public pension scheme, 
which leaves little room for institutional investors and thus reduces the potential demand for shares, and the 
legal system, which has been blamed for failing to protect minority shareholders and small investors. 
12 According to Balconi (2015), total factor productivity has fallen in Italy over the past 20 years and increased 
only marginally in Spain, compared to the cumulative growth of about 10% in France and Germany, and 8%, 
on average, in the Eurozone.	
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2.4.  Hypotheses Development 
 
Prior literature has established the existence of a non-monotonic relationship between 
leverage and performance; higher levels of leverage may reduce the value of the firm and 
negatively impact its performance. However, the relationship between leverage and 
ownership, and particularly foreign ownership, remains unclear.  
 
In line with agency theory, foreign ownership -- placing a particular emphasis on managerial 
control and shareholder protection (Heugens et al., 2009) -- is expected to be associated with 
lower levels of debt. Foreign-owned firms, while enjoying greater availability and stability of 
internal funds, will be inclined to reduce their dependence on short-term borrowing and long-
term debt, minimizing as such their bankruptcy risks (Grossman and Hart, 1982, Graham and 
Rogers, 2002). The high uncertainty and dangers bestowed to the target’s survival by the 
increased levels of debts would outweigh the tax benefits from utilizing external funding to 
support their operations.  
 
Meanwhile, it is further expected that in institutional settings where managerial freedom can 
be hampered -- like in bank-based economies -- foreign owners will attempt to take over 
managerial control of the acquired firms by reducing the debt levels and thus the role of 
banks in the financial composition of their affiliates. Prior literature exploring the behavior 
and capital structure of subsidiary companies reveals that parent companies alter significantly 
the overall level and composition of debt of their subsidiaries, particularly when faced with 
uncertain political environments and/or very diverse institutional settings. In fact, in a paper 
published in the Journal of Finance by Desai, Foley and Hines (2004), it is clearly shown 
that in countries with either weaker creditor rights or shallow capital markets, parent 
companies tend to reduce the external debt levels of their subsidiaries even up to three 
quarters, and replace them with internal funds instead. This is done in an attempt to reduce 
the external influences on their affiliates.  
 
In sum, we expect that firms in bank-based economies acquired by foreign investors will 
present lower levels of gearing and short-term leverage compared to firms acquired by 
domestic investors. Considering the individualities of domestic firms in Italy and Spain, and 
specifically their overreliance on bank credit and restricted financing availability (resulting 
from underdeveloped private equity markets and their small size), we expect that the impact 
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of foreign acquisitions on debt ratios will be highly pronounced in these settings, whereas the 
same motivation would not exist among the domestically-owned companies. In other words, 
we propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 1:   Italian and Spanish firms acquired by foreign investors will present a 
significant reduction in short-term leverage ratios after the acquisition deal 
compared to firms acquired by domestic investors. 
Hypothesis 2:   Italian and Spanish firms acquired by foreign investors will present a 
significant reduction in gearing ratios after the acquisition deal compared to 
firms acquired by domestic investors. 
 
 
3. Research Design 
 
In this section we present the empirical methodology, data sources, and preliminary 
descriptive statistics relating to acquisitions in Italy and Spain and to the main variables that 
we use.  
 
3.1. Data Sources 
 
We base our analysis on financial account data (unconsolidated) extracted from the Amadeus 
data set for firms in Italy and Spain for the period between 2002 and 2010. We limit our 
sample to firms that are classified as private firms and that operate in manufacturing and 
services industries. We consider the following as private firms: joint stock companies, limited 
liability companies, limited liability consortium, one-person company with limited liability, 
and one person joint stock company. The vast majority of firms in the dataset fall within the 
definition of private firms.13  
 
Since we employ lagged values in our empirical analysis, firms must have data on all the 
variables of interest for at least two years to be included in our sample. 14  Financial 																																																								
13 In Italy 94.23% are considered private and in Spain 99.5%. Within the subsample of private firms, the vast       
majority consists of limited liability companies (72% in Italy and 76% in Spain). 
14 More precisely, we limit our data to firms that have at least two years of data for scale, age, productivity and 
capital to labor ratio (see Section 3.2 for variable definitions). Furthermore, propensity score estimations and 
matching results are based on samples with at least two years of data of either short-term leverage or gearing, 
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institutions and insurance companies are excluded from the analysis due to compatibility 
issues with the format of financial accounts. Information on acquisitions is retrieved from the 
Zephyr database and matched to Amadeus data using firm identifiers of acquired firms.15 
This matching process allows us to identify Italian and Spanish firms that were acquired 
during the period of study, as well as the nationality of the acquiring firm.  
 
The extracted (monetary) variables for manufacturing firms are deflated using industry 
producer price indices at the 2-digit NACE code level, whereas those for services firms are 
deflated using the GDP deflator with base year 2005. Data on price indices and employment 
size classes at the country-industry level are collected from Eurostat. The final sample is an 
unbalanced panel with around 120000 firms per year for each country. 
 
3.2. Empirical Methodology 
 
The key objective of our empirical analysis is to evaluate the causal effect of both foreign and 
domestic acquisition on firms’ debt ratios. To control for endogenous factors affecting the 
acquisition decision process,16 we follow recent empirical work on international investment 
and foreign ownership (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Alfaro and Chen, 2012) and compute the 
acquisition effect using propensity score matching, as suggested by Heckman et al. (1997). 
Formally, the effect of acquisition in a given time period can be expressed as:  
 ! "#	 − "& '() = 1 = ! "# '() = 1 − ! "& '() = 1 																			(1) 
 
where " denotes the outcome of interest and the subscript of " represents the hypothetical 
circumstances under which the outcome is evaluated, taking the value one for foreign 
(domestic) acquisition and zero for non-acquisition. In particular, we focus on two outcome 
variables; namely short-term leverage (ratio of short term debt to total assets) and gearing 
(short and long term debt to shareholders funds ratio). In other words, Eq. (1) represents the 
difference between the outcome measure for an acquired firm and the analogous measure for 
the same firm had it not been acquired. The latter, however, is an unobserved counterfactual, 
and hence we need to construct it using the matching procedure; that is, by identifying a non-																																																																																																																																																																												
depending on which one is used as the outcome variable. Note that we use linear interpolation to fill a small 
proportion of missing values in these variables. 
15 The availability of acquisition deals in Zephyr at the time of extraction was relatively lower in 2010 (see 
Table 1). However, excluding the year 2010 does not change our results. 
16 Such as self-selection of large and more productive firms (Helpman et al., 2004) and/or “cherry-picking" of 
the best performing ones (Harris and Robinson, 2003).	
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acquired match with similar observable characteristics for each acquired firm. The underlying 
assumption for the validity of this approach is that, conditional on observable characteristics, 
the treated (acquired firms) and the matched non-treated (non-acquired domestically-owned 
firms) would perform similarly under the same circumstances. To this end, we can re-write 
Eq. (1) as:  
 ! "# '() = 1, / − ! "#& '() = 0, / −	 ! "&# '() = 1, / − ! "#& '() = 0, / 				(2)	 
 
where the first term captures the causal effect of acquisition (the difference between the 
outcome of acquired firms and a carefully selected group of non-acquired domestically-
owned firms with similar observable characteristics) and the second term captures the 
selection bias (the difference between the outcome of acquired firms, under the hypothetical 
circumstances that they had not been acquired, and the outcome of non-acquired 
domestically-owned firms). /  is a vector of observable characteristics. Our aim is to 
minimize the selection bias by applying propensity score matching techniques and thus 
estimate the causal effect of acquisition as the difference in the sample average of the 
outcome for treated and non-treated firms.  
 
As shown by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), conditioning on all variables in the treatment 
model is equivalent to conditioning on the propensity score (the predicted probability of 
treatment), which in our case is the conditional probability of acquisition given firm 
characteristics and past firm performance. We thus proceed in two stages. In the first stage, 
we estimate the propensity score, separately for each country, using the following probit 
model: ′'()34546478′9:;< = Φ >?9:;<@# + B: + C; + D< + E 																					(3) 
 
where ‘Acquisition’ is a dummy variable that equals one in the year of a foreign (domestic) 
acquisition, and zero if the firm is not foreign-owned or a multinational and has not been 
acquired during the sampled period; Ownership is captured by any ownership stake over a 
threshold of 50% of total shareholding; Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of a 
standard normally distributed random variable; Z is a vector of control variables, expressed in 
natural logarithms and lagged by one year to account for pre-acquisition characteristics; 4, 8, G, H index firm, industry (at 2-digit NACE code level), region (at NUTS 2 code level), and 
time, respectively. We follow the existing literature on acquisitions and include the following 
control variables in vector Z:  
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Productivity: measured as turnover per employee. Turnover corresponds to total 
operating revenues measured as net sales plus stock variations and other operating 
revenues.  
Scale: measured by the number of employees. 
Age: measured by the number of years since establishment. 
Capital to labor ratio (K/L): measured as tangible assets by employee.  
 
We also include in vector Z the outcome variable (short-term leverage or gearing) and its 
squared term:17 
Short-term leverage (LeverageST):  measured as the ratio of short term debt to total 
assets, where total assets is the sum of current assets and fixed assets and short term 
debt corresponds to the sum of short term financial debts to credit institutions (loans 
and credits) and part of long term financial debts payable within the year. 
Gearing: measured as the ratio of short and long term debt to shareholders funds. 
 
The addition of the outcome variable and its square term among the control variables in Eq. 
(3) ensures that matches assigned on the propensity score will be homogeneous in terms of 
their previous debt levels. To capture unobserved heterogeneity, we also include industry 
( B: ), region ( C; ) and year (D< ) fixed effects. Finally, to ensure that the sample is 
representative of the relevant population of firms in each industry, all regressions are 
weighted by size classes at the industry level. More specifically, firms are divided in five size 
classes based on the median number of employees; with categories being: less than 10, 
between 10 and 19, between 20 and 49, between 50 and 249 and 250 or more (Eurostat size-
class breakdown).  
 
In the second stage, we employ five-nearest neighbors matching18  and compare the outcome 
variables within observations matched by the propensity score. More precisely, each treated 
																																																								
17 We estimate two versions of equation (3), one where gearing and its squared term are included as controls and 
one where short term leverage and its squared term are included as controls. The first version is the basis for 
the matching procedure where gearing is the outcome under consideration, while the second version is the 
basis for the matching procedure where short-term leverage is the outcome variable. 
18 In the five-nearest neighbors matching, the counterfactual outcome is made up of the average of the five 
control group observations closest in their propensity score to the treated observation. To reduce the likelihood 
of poor matches, the matching is carried out with replacement (each control can serve as the counterfactual for 
more than one treated observation) using a 0.005 caliper (the difference in the propensity score between 
treated and control	 observations). In addition, we exclude observations outside the common support, bound by 
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firm 6 is matched with IJK = 5	controls that are closest in terms of the propensity score. The 
outcome variable of each of the controls ( matched to treated firm 6 is weighted by MJK =1/IJK. We also impose the restriction that the matched control observations must come from 
the same industry, size class, and productivity group19 as the acquired firm. This eliminates 
the probability that different levels of capital structure across industry, size, and productivity 
combinations exert influence on our estimated results. To examine whether the model for the 
propensity score is misspecified, we perform tests of the balancing property; that is, we test 
the significance of differences between acquired and matched firms for each variable entering 
the propensity score estimation. Formally, the average treatment effect (‘ATT’) of acquisition 
in the year of acquisition (when		O = 0) and the subsequent three years (when		O = 1,2,3) is 
calculated as: 
 'PPQ = 1I (R8"SKTU9V9J9W:	<XS;YQJZ# ) −	 1I (MKR8"SKTU9V9J9W:	<XS;YQKZ# )		O = 	0,1,2,3					(4) 
where MK = MJKJ . 
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 1 summarizes the number of foreign and domestic acquisitions and the number of pre-
matched control observations by country and year. It shows a steady increase of domestic and 
foreign acquisitions in both countries up to 2008, followed by a drop of acquisitions in 2009. 
Table 1 also shows a larger number of domestic acquisitions compared to foreign 
acquisitions, in both countries and all years. 
 
---- Insert Table 1 here ---- 
 
Table 2 lists the top ten home countries of foreign acquirers, separately for Italy and Spain. 
These top 10 countries account for almost 80% of all acquisition deals. As we can see from 
this table, most acquirers originate from other European countries. More precisely, 70% of 
foreign acquisitions of Spanish firms and 60% of foreign acquisitions of Italian firms are 
made by acquirers originating from other European economies. Outside Europe, firms from 																																																																																																																																																																												
the lowest propensity score of a treated observation and the highest propensity score of a matched control 
observation. 
19 We divide firms into five productivity groups based on the median value of the turnover per employee. 
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the USA hold a significant share of the foreign acquisitions (18% in the case of Italy, and 
13% in the case of Spain). Furthermore, most acquirers originate from developed economies, 
with India being the only developing country in the top 10 of home countries for acquisitions 
made in Italy.  
 
---- Insert Table 2 here ---- 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables (i.e. the variables included in our 
propensity score regressions), while distinguishing between three categories of firms; firms 
acquired by foreign companies, firms acquired by domestic companies, and domestic non-
acquired firms. We can discern here that, on average,20 target firms are more productive, 
larger and older than non-acquired domestic firms; they are also less capital intensive and 
have a lower gearing ratio but a higher short-term leverage ratio in comparison to domestic 
non-acquired firms. When comparing between foreign and domestic acquisitions, we can see 
that firms acquired by foreign companies are larger, more productive, less capital intensive 
and have a lower gearing ratio than firms acquired by domestic investors.21  
 
Additional bilateral comparative analysis of the same variables for target firms and their 
acquirers shows that the acquiring companies in our sample -- particularly the foreign ones -- 
are very robust and in a much better financial condition than the targets prior to the 
acquisition event. More precisely, we find that acquiring firms are more productive, larger, 
older and more capital intensive than the acquired (target) firms, and these differences are 
more pronounced when acquirers are foreign. We also find that acquirers in general and 
foreign acquirers in particular are in a better shape in terms of capital structure than the 
targets; that is, firms acquired by foreign investors exhibit significantly higher (pre-
acquisition) debt ratios compared to these investors.22 
 
---- Insert Table 3 here ---- 
 
We now turn to discuss some statistical evidence of the relevance of debt for firms’ chances 
of survival. We perform a simple empirical exercise where we estimate the probability of exit 																																																								
20 … and without accounting for other firm-characteristics and industry/region heterogeneities.  
21 Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix present the distribution of firms by industry and by size class. 
22 Due to data limitations, this bilateral comparison is based on a sub-sample of the acquisition cases used in the 
paper. Therefore, the corresponding results are not reported in the paper but are available upon request. 
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of firm i in year t and investigate the link between our two debt ratios (‘Gearing’ and ‘Short-
term Leverage’) and the probability of exit.23  We consider that a firm has exited the market 
if, for two consecutive years, it has not reported data for key variables, like employment, 
turnover or sales. The results, reported in Table 4, show a strong and positive relationship 
between the levels of debt and the probability of exit. More precisely, the coefficient on the 
debt ratio is positive and statistically significant for both Italy and Spain during the sampled 
period, and this effect persists regardless of the proxy used for debt. A more sophisticated 
empirical analysis is, of course, needed to draw robust econometric inferences about the 
impact of debt reduction on firms’ survival chances. Nevertheless, we feel that this exercise 
is descriptively consistent with our theoretical framework where lower debt levels can 
mitigate the risk of failure, and outlines the importance of studying the factors that could 
potentially reduce a firm’s debt ratios. 
 
---- Insert Table 4 here ----  
 
4. Findings   
 
4.1. Determinants of Foreign and Domestic Acquisition 
 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of Eq. (3) for each country, exploring some of 
the most prevalent factors influencing the decision of a foreign or domestic investor to 
acquire a firm in Italy or Spain. 
 
---- Insert Table 5 here ---- 
 
As a first point, we can notice that, as expected, productive firms are more attractive to 
foreign acquirers than to domestic acquirers: the estimated coefficient on ‘Productivity’ 
appears to be positive and statistically significant only in the equations estimating the 
probability of foreign acquisition. Past studies have already suggested that foreign investors 																																																								
23 We estimate the probability of exit using a complementary log-log model (cloglog) which is a discrete-time 
version of the Cox proportional hazard model (Görg and Spaliara, 2014). As right-hand-side variables, we use 
a measure of firm-level debt (‘Gearing’ and ‘Short-term Leverage’), scale and its squared term, age and its 
squared term, productivity, capital intensity and the ratio of intangible assets to total employment. All right-
hand-side variables are expressed in natural logarithm and lagged by two years (due to the definition used for 
the exit variable). We also include a full set of fixed effects at the year, industry and regional levels. Full 
results are available upon request. 
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tend to prefer well-performing firms to invest in (Harris and Robinson, 2003). On the 
contrary, domestic investors who have better knowledge of the local market, customers, and 
business networks, rely less heavily on observable information (i.e. productivity) to select 
their potential targets.24  
 
Furthermore, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between acquisition 
and size (measured in terms of the number of employees) for both countries, and a negative 
relationship between acquisition and age - although it is statistically significant only in the 
case of Italy. These findings denote that larger and younger firms are more likely to be 
acquired. On one hand, large, established firms, having considerable market experience and 
assets to offer, can be seen as more reliable investment options, particularly in less efficient 
markets, like Italy and Spain (Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992, Barbosa and Louri, 2005). 
On the other hand, younger firms can potentially offer higher growth opportunities for their 
acquirers, and are thus manage to offset the liabilities of experience and size. 
 
Capital intensity is also found to significantly affect acquisitiveness, as also shown in the 
studies of Shapiro (1980) and Gedajlovic (1993). Yet, the impact of capital intensity is 
different across the two countries: foreign acquirers of Italian firms tend to favor higher 
capital to labor ratios, whereas those of Spanish firms tend to favor lower capital to labor 
ratios. Finally, acquisitiveness is significantly influenced by industry, year and region 
specific effects (coefficients not reported). 
 
It is noteworthy that in the case of Italy prior debt levels do not seem to be a determinant 
factor of acquisitions, foreign or domestic. Nevertheless, Spain appears to be a different case 
altogether; we do find that in Spain higher levels of short-term leverage do increase the 
probability of foreign acquisitions, while reducing the probability of domestic acquisitions.  
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
24 Even though firms acquired by foreign investors are more productive than those acquired by domestic 
investors, there is still a large productivity gap between targets and their foreign acquirers. This observation, 
however, is based on a comparative analysis of targets and acquiring firms that only covers a sub-sample of 
acquisition cases (see also footnote 20). 
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4.2. The Impact of Acquisitions on the Debt Ratios of Acquired Firms 
 
The predicted probabilities (or propensity scores) of acquisition, calculated using the 
estimates presented in Table 5, form the basis of the matching procedure. We thus proceed by 
considering the results from the five-nearest neighbors matching.  
 
Panel (a) of Table 6 shows the ATT of foreign acquisition on ‘Gearing’. The evidence 
obtained suggests that foreign acquisition leads to a significant and steady reduction in the 
long term debt ratio: while the treated and control groups start with very similar levels of 
‘Gearing’ in the pre-acquisition period, the former exhibit lower levels of debt in the 
subsequent years. Specifically, during the year of acquisition, foreign-acquired Italian 
(Spanish) firms have 49% (40%) lower gearing ratio compared to their matched control 
observations. The reduction in the ‘Gearing’ ratio increases to 62% (54%) in the first year 
following the acquisition, reaches its peak at 67% (81%) in the second year, and declines 
moderately to 57% (78%) in the third year. 25  The relatively small impact of foreign 
acquisition in Year 0 suggests the presence of restructuring costs that increase the gearing 
ratio in the year of completion.  
 
Panel (b) of Table 6 shows the ATT of domestic acquisition on ‘Gearing’. The results 
indicate that, when firms are acquired by domestic investors, changes to the long-term debt 
ratio are smaller and statistically less robust. More precisely, for Italian firms, the ATT of 
domestic acquisition is negative and statistically significant in all four years, but appears to 
be substantially lower in absolute value compared to that of foreign acquisition. For instance, 
in the three post-acquisition years, reduction in the gearing ratio of acquired firms amounts to 
24%-32% compared to the control group. However, for Spanish firms, the ATT of domestic 
acquisition is positive (acquired firms have higher gearing ratio than their non-acquired local 
matches) and marginally statistically significant in the year of completion, but fails to reach 
statistical significance in the three years thereafter. Formal paired 6-tests between acquired 
and matched control firms fail to reject the balancing hypothesis for all variables entering the 
propensity score estimation, confirming that our matching procedure has grouped together 
homogeneous firms (see Table A.3 in the Appendix). 
 																																																								
25 Since the ATT is calculated for the log of the gearing ratio, the reported percentages are obtained by taking 
the exponential of the ATT and subtracting one.  
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The decrease in debt associated with foreign acquisition is verified when we use ‘LeverageST’ 
as the outcome variable (see panel (c) of Table 6). The results indicate that foreign-acquired 
firms exhibit on average lower short-term debt ratios than their matched control observations: 
the reduction in ‘LeverageST’ of treated firms is both statistically and economically 
significant, starting from 60% and 24% in the acquisition year (for Italy and Spain 
respectively) and reaching a peak at 89% and 84% in the second year after acquisition. In 
contrast, the effect of domestic acquisition on ‘LeverageST’ is either small or statistically 
insignificant or of the opposite sign (see panel (d) of Table 6). For instance, in the case of 
Spain, we detect a positive and statistically significant rise in short term indebtedness during 
the completion year and the two post-acquisition years. 
 
The stronger impact of foreign acquisition, compared to domestic acquisition, on the debt 
levels of the target firms is confirmed when we carry out a test of the hypothesis that the 
ATTs for the two groups are statistically the same (see Table 7). Specifically, the results of 
this test suggest that, during the completion year in Spain and the three post-acquisition years 
in both Italy and Spain, the reduction in ‘Gearing’ and ‘LeverageST’ is larger when the firms 
are acquired by foreign investors than when they are acquired by domestic investors. 
 
---- Insert Table 6 and Table 7 here ---- 
 
We take our analysis a step further and investigate whether the development level of the 
country of origin of acquiring firms has an impact on our findings. To do that, we focus on 
acquisitions from high-income OECD countries, 26  which, as shown in Table 2, constitute the 
majority of foreign acquisitions in our sample. 27  Specifically, we perform the same 
propensity score matching methodology as before, but we now assume that only firms 
acquired by investors originating from high-income OECD countries receive the treatment. 
The corresponding results, presented in Table 8, are very similar to those reported in Table 6 
for the full sample of foreign acquirers, in terms of sign and statistical significance. 
Qualitatively though, the effects are now relatively stronger, suggesting that the impact of 																																																								
26 Following the World Bank’s definition of high income OECD countries, we include the following countries 
in this category: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy (only in the case of Spanish targets), Japan, South Korea, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain (only in the 
case of Italian targets), Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.  
27 Note that we are not able to perform a separate matching procedure for each individual foreign nationality, as 
we have very few acquisitions in each case. 
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foreign acquisition on debt reduction of target firms in Italy and Spain is actually less 
pronounced when the acquiring firms originate from low-income, developing countries.  
 
---- Insert Table 8 here ---- 
 
4.3. Robustness Tests 
 
We perform a number of tests to assess the robustness of the above findings (results available 
upon request).  
 
First, we implement changes to the propensity score equation, such as adding profitability 
ratios, cash flow to turnover ratios, and square terms of scale and age among the regressors. 
Second, we consider alternative matching methodologies, including the one-to-one nearest 
neighbor matching and Epanechnikov kernel matching. The results obtained from these tests 
provide evidence that supports the findings of the previous section: foreign acquisition leads 
to a significant and steady reduction in ‘Gearing’ and ‘LeverageST’, whereas domestic 
acquisition is associated with smaller and statistically less robust (or of the opposite 
direction) effects. 
 
Third, we check whether the observed differences between foreign acquired, domestically 
acquired and non-acquired firms are uniquely associated with the crisis and post-crisis years. 
To investigate this issue, we restrict the sample to include the pre-2008 period and carry out 
the same analysis as before. Despite the obvious comparability problems with this approach 
(due to the smaller number of matched targets), the matching estimates for the pre-crisis 
period are similar to those for the full sample period and lead to the same inferences. This 
suggests that the reported debt effects of foreign acquisitions in Italy and Spain are not driven 
by the fact that the acquiring firms are originating from countries that were less severely 
affected by the crisis. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we investigate the role of foreign versus domestic ownership in reducing the 
debt levels of acquired (target) firms in Italy and Spain. The empirical literature has been 
predominately concentrated on the post-acquisition performance relationship of acquiring 
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firms, while measuring performance mainly in productivity and profitability terms (Li et al., 
2015, Markides and Ittner, 1994, Ning et al., 2014). In addition, the majority of past research 
has concentrated on the performance of the acquirer, despite significant differences being 
identified between the two groups (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Our study contributes to this 
body of literature in key distinct ways.  
 
First, we provide clear evidence of the impact of foreign and domestic acquisitions on debt 
levels of the target firms and offer an appreciation of how the change in ownership affects the 
counterparty instead. In order to estimate the causal impact of ownership changes, we control 
for selection bias by applying propensity score matching techniques. Our results confirm our 
expectations that a change from domestic to foreign ownership leads to a lower reliance on 
short and long term debt. In fact, our findings show a steady reduction in the gearing and 
short-term leverage ratios for both Italian and Spanish firms. The reduction in debt is not 
associated with a change of ownership per se, but only when the ownership is transferred to 
foreign investors. As such, an acquisition by domestic investors offers no significant 
reduction in debt. Interestingly, in the case of Spain, our findings suggest a contrary effect, 
with domestic acquisition actually resulting in an increase of the short-term leverage ratio of 
target firms and a potential deterioration of a firm’s financial health and survival chances.  
 
The above findings offer strong support to both our hypotheses (H1 and H2), denoting the 
distinct effect of foreign ownership on debt reduction. We can see that foreign ownership not 
only yields higher profitability and productivity for the target firms (i.e. Arnold and Javorcik, 
2009; Hijzen et al., 2013), but can further act as a deterrent against debt over-exposure, 
leading as such to more financially healthy target firms. The proponents of the ‘agency’ and 
‘stakeholder’ theories have long supported that the presence of foreign investors has the 
power to enhance managerial control, (Heugens, et al. 2009), minimize managerial 
opportunism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and increase overall shareholder protection 
against the risk associated to high leverage (Grossman and Hart, 1982, Wiseman and 
Catanach, 1997). We offer strong support to the above.  
 
Second, we examine measures of long- and short-term debt, which have never been explicitly 
examined in the past, to further augment our understanding regarding the overall impact of a 
change in ownership. We find that foreign ownership reduces significantly both gearing and 
short-term leverage ratios in both countries. Acknowledging the important role of banks in 
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Italy and Spain, this finding comes to validate Desai et al. (2004), who argue that parent 
companies would be inclined to reduce external influences on their affiliates when faced with 
highly regulated and uncertain institutions. Nevertheless, we find that the reduction in the 
short-term leverage is much larger in total. This might be further explained by the 
predominance of smaller-sized companies within the two examined countries. Titman and 
Wessels (1988) have long suggested that smaller sized companies use significantly more 
short-term debt to finance their operations. Therefore, it could be expected foreign acquirers - 
out of prudency - to reduce the target’s short-term over-exposure, minimizing as such the 
associated default risks and their overall external control.  
 
Third, and while the acquisition literature has mainly concentrated on post-acquisition 
performance from the point of view of the acquirer, the evidence suggests that the 
performance effects for the acquirer and the target companies are not the same (Datta et al., 
1992, Haleblian et al., 2009, Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). In this study, we concentrate on the 
impact that foreign ownership has on target firms and offer new insights on the impact of a 
takeover deal for these companies. After all, the success of an acquisition deal is often 
accredited to the integration and strategic fit between the acquirer and the target company 
(Chatterjee et al., 1992, Child et al., 2000). Therefore, and acknowledging that a foreign 
acquisition is typically followed by significant changes in the operational and managerial 
practices imposed in the target company (Child et al., 2000), we feel it is imperative for the 
integration process to understand which of these practices are effective. Our study clearly 
shows that foreign ownership is positively impacting on the capital structure of target 
companies, reducing as such their overall risk profile that can potentially strengthen their 
survival (Beaver, 1966).  
 
Some further interesting findings obtained from our analysis relate to certain firm 
characteristics of the target companies. For instance, our analysis has showed -- in line with 
past research -- that larger and younger firms are more likely to be acquired, especially in less 
efficient markets and particularly from foreign investors. Apparently, these companies are 
seen as more reliable investments by foreign investors who tend to be rather ‘prudent’ in their 
choices (Abdioglu et al., 2015).  
 
Finally, the above findings have important policy implications that may contradict the old 
conservative European agendas in encouraging the emergence of “national champions” 
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(Monti, 2006; Soares, 2008). It is clearly showcased here that foreign acquisitions can benefit 
significantly acquired (domestic) firms, offering consequently important overall contributions 
to the domestic economy in which they operate. Taxation and financial benefits, but also 
spillover effects, sharing new competencies, resources and developing stronger networking 
alliances with the domestic market (O’Donnell and Blumentritt, 1999; Haskel et al., 2007) 
are only some of the associated benefits. Therefore, foreign investment opportunities should 
be welcomed and supported by national governments, especially in the less-efficient bank-
based economies. Implementing policies aimed at attracting foreign investment can also be 
particularly beneficial for countries like Italy and Spain, which are characterized by 
underdeveloped private equity markets and an overwhelming large share of SMEs, and thus 
overreliance on bank credit and restricted financing availability for domestic firms.  
 
6. Limitations and Future Research 
 
As outlined in the previous section, our study offers important and novel contributions to the 
foreign ownership - debt relationship. However, it also has some limitations, which can be 
used as the starting point for future research work in this area. First, while we can identify the 
nationality of all acquiring firms, we are able to collect data on other characteristics (such as 
size, age and financial performance) only for a sub-sample of these firms. Our analysis thus 
cannot explain whether the observed acquisition effects vary systematically across targets 
acquired by different types of acquiring firms (e.g. large business groups versus small firms).  
 
Second, due to data availability and the complexity of the research design, our study focuses 
only on two economies. Extending the sample to include more countries could enable 
scholars to examine whether the positive relationship between foreign acquisitions and debt 
reduction is actually a universal phenomenon, and to explore the conditionality of effects 
upon host country characteristics, such as the level of financial development and the type of 
financial system. Likewise, by constructing a multi-national panel dataset and employing a 
large number of propensity score matched cases, one could investigate which industries can 
benefit the most from foreign acquisitions, in terms of changes in their capital structure.  
 
Finally, and while we offer several compelling explanations for the motivations behind the 
reduction in debt levels of the foreign target companies, the scope and structure of the current 
study do not allow us to explore in more detail the motivations of such a behavior, prioritize 
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among them and/or uncover missing links. A future research based on personal interviews 
with the decision-makers could offer invaluable insights to our understanding of their 
motivations, as well as the role that specific managerial characteristics play for their 
decisions after each acquisition deal. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Debt to financial assets ratio of non-financial corporations in euro countries 
 
Sources: ECB and Eurostat 
 
 
Table 1: Counts of acquisitions and controls by year 
  Italy   Spain 
Year 
Foreign  
Acquisitions  
Domestic  
Acquisitions   Controls    
Foreign  
Acquisitions  
Domestic  
Acquisitions   Controls  
2002 11 34 108601 
 
13 33 108002 
2003 11 26 112744 
 
13 54 113003 
2004 14 35 117137 
 
22 34 117628 
2005 30 36 121274 
 
33 39 121687 
2006 31 39 124893 
 
26 71 124929 
2007 35 51 127069 
 
45 90 126908 
2008 41 62 127489 
 
62 133 127568 
2009 19 37 127491 
 
21 90 127568 
2010 6 9 127491 
 
6 20 127568 
Total 198 329 1094189  241 564 1094861 
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Table 2: Top 10 countries of foreign acquirers 
 
Italy 
  
Spain 
Country 
Number of 
Acquisitions  
% of 
Total 
 
Country 
Number of 
Acquisitions  
% of 
Total 
United States 36 18.18 
 
France 38 15.83 
Germany 25 12.63 
 
United 
Kingdom 36 15.00 
France 22 11.11 
 
United States 31 12.92 
United 
Kingdom 19 9.60 
 
Germany 19 7.92 
Spain 11 5.56 
 
Italy 19 7.92 
Switzerland 9 4.55 
 
Portugal 15 6.25 
Belgium 8 4.04 
 
Belgium 11 4.58 
Sweden 8 4.04 
 
Sweden 10 4.17 
India 6 3.03 
 
Netherlands 7 2.92 
Netherlands 6 3.03 
 
Japan 5 2.08 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the main variables 
 
Italy 
 
Spain 
 
Foreign  Domestic  Controls 
 
Foreign  Domestic  Controls 
 Acquisitions Acquisitions   Acquisitions Acquisitions  
Productivity 635.39 455.22 477.53 
 
380.32 313.67 285.22 
 
(1356.44) (1245.99) (1070.47) 
 
(890.92) (633.15) (557.60) 
Scale 175.46 147.11 26.65 
 
141.10 100.26 26.04 
 
(386.46) (284.66) (86.31) 
 
(239.75) (228.76) (79.63) 
Age 20.81 20.09 16.70 
 
21.03 18.74 14.10 
 
(15.84) (14.34) (12.96) 
 
(15.22) (14.68) (10.47) 
K/L 90.86 98.19 121.04 
 
96.28 114.82 180.93 
 
(451.08) (448.59) (677.36) 
 
(488.58) (609.45) (707.70) 
Gearing 150.92 169.44 198.29 
 
95.37 125.91 103.43 
 
(195.11) (195.4) (225.53) 
 
(143.70) (179.49) (164.47) 
LeverageST 12.34 12.89 11.40 
 
7.57 7.29 3.20 
 
(17.28) (17.84) (16.09) 
 
(11.39) (12.36) (9.08) 
   Note: Columns report mean values. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
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Table 4: Debt ratios and the probability of exit 
 
Italy Spain 
 
Gearing LeverageST Gearing LeverageST 
ln(Debt ratio) 0.018** 0.006* 0.051*** 0.013** 
 
(0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
Industry, time, region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 240412 260065 460080 511111 
Log Pseudo-likelihood -1056995.6 -1149835.7 -1156749.1 -1274303.3 
Wald chi2 12295.77 14225.51 7272.70 9802.37 
prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: Exit is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has two consecutive years of missing data for key variables. 
Explanatory variables lagged by two years. Columns report estimated coefficients. Robust p-values in parentheses. 
Regressions are weighted by country-industry sampling weights. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Propensity score estimation 
 
Italy Spain 
 
Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic 
 
Acquisition Acquisition Acquisition Acquisition 
Control for Gearing 
ln(Productivity) 0.276*** -0.004 0.253** 0.022 
 
(0.045) (0.111) (0.103) (0.052) 
ln(Scale) 0.325*** 0.221*** 0.255*** 0.274*** 
 
(0.025) (0.063) (0.055) (0.030) 
ln(Age) -0.045*** -0.055*** 0.074 -0.012 
 
(0.018) (0.014) (0.090) (0.015) 
ln(K/L) 0.067** 0.028 -0.114* 0.071* 
 
(0.027) (0.032) (0.060) (0.036) 
ln(Gearing) 0.258 0.320* -0.010 -0.005 
 
(0.241) (0.183) (0.015) (0.010) 
ln(Gearing)2 -0.032 -0.039* -0.012*** -0.003 
 
(0.028) (0.023) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant -12.412*** -5.861*** -8.591*** -4.458*** 
 
(1.094) (1.452) (1.593) (0.723) 
Industry, time, region dummies yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 573171 636119 607160 694528 
Pseudo-R2 0.231 0.182 0.306 0.164 
Control for LeverageST 
ln(Productivity) 0.267*** -0.012 0.208** 0.046 
 
(0.044) (0.096) (0.101) (0.046) 
ln(Scale) 0.344*** 0.222*** 0.248*** 0.237*** 
 
(0.020) (0.061) (0.056) (0.039) 
ln(Age) -0.038** -0.046*** 0.112 -0.030 
 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.080) (0.020) 
ln(K/L) 0.064*** 0.026 -0.089* 0.044 
 
(0.024) (0.03) (0.049) (0.034) 
ln(LeverageST) -0.019 0.018 0.042*** -0.064* 
 
(0.026) (0.018) (0.016) (0.036) 
ln(LeverageST)2 -0.003 -0.001 0.005** -0.014** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) 
Constant -9.230*** -5.194*** -8.417*** -4.462*** 
 
(0.757) (1.320) (1.501) (0.727) 
Industry, time, region dummies yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 640313 697837 715897 791181 
Pseudo-R2 0.227 0.179 0.271 0.185 
Note: Foreign (domestic) acquisition is a dummy variable that equals one in the year of a foreign (domestic) 
acquisition. Explanatory variables lagged by one year. Columns report estimated coefficients. Robust p-values 
in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by country-industry sampling weights. ***,**,* Statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 6: The impact of acquisitions on acquired firms’ debt ratios 
Panel (a): Foreign acquisition/ Gearing 
 
Italy Spain 
Year ATT 
 
N ATT 
 
N 
0 -0.683*** (0.170) 137 -0.516* (0.270) 155 
1 -0.980*** (0.226) 123 -0.767** (0.308) 135 
2 -1.121*** (0.246) 110 -1.644*** (0.341) 110 
3 -0.855*** (0.240) 84 -1.525*** (0.425) 76 
Panel (b): Domestic acquisition/ Gearing  
 
Italy Spain 
Year ATT 
 
N ATT 
 
N 
0 -0.552*** (0.120) 208 0.284* (0.171) 323 
1 -0.274** (0.113) 183 0.224 (0.190) 281 
2 -0.268** (0.106) 151 -0.142 (0.247) 208 
3 -0.393** (0.198) 112 -0.348 (0.329) 136 
Panel (c): Foreign acquisition/ LeverageST 
 
Italy Spain 
Year ATT 
 
N ATT 
 
N 
0 -0.904** (0.398) 147 -0.269 (0.309) 168 
1 -1.743*** (0.485) 123 -0.940*** (0.303) 139 
2 -2.199*** (0.546) 99 -1.857*** (0.430) 97 
3 -1.814** (0.747) 75 -1.720*** (0.574) 62 
Panel (d): Domestic acquisition/ LeverageST 
 
Italy Spain 
Year ATT 
 
N ATT 
 
N 
0 -0.467 (0.345) 219 0.939*** (0.199) 391 
1 -0.423 (0.339) 177 1.192*** (0.269) 300 
2 -0.418 (0.442) 134 0.676** (0.335) 197 
3 -0.266 (0.484) 94 -0.611 (0.406) 135 
Note: five-nearest neighbor matching. ATT denotes average treatment effect on the treated. N denotes the number of 
matched targets. Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Test the equality of the ATTs between foreign and domestic acquisitions 
Gearing  
 
Italy Spain 
Year Diff in ATT 
 
N Diff in ATT 
 
N 
0 -0.131 (0.208) 345 -0.800*** (0.320) 478 
1 -0.706*** (0.253) 306 -0.991*** (0.362) 416 
2 -0.853*** (0.268) 261 -1.502*** (0.421) 318 
3 -0.462* (0.311) 196 -1.177** (0.537) 212 
LeverageST 
 
Italy Spain 
Year Diff in ATT 
 
N Diff in ATT 
 
N 
0 -0.437 (0.527) 366 -1.208*** (0.368) 559 
1 -1.320** (0.592) 300 -2.132*** (0.405) 439 
2 -1.781*** (0.703) 233 -2.533*** (0.545) 294 
3 -1.548** (0.890) 169 -1.109* (0.703) 197 
Note: Reports the results of a one-sided test (standard errors in parenthesis), where H0: the difference in the ATT between 
foreign and domestic matched targets is equal to zero, and H1: the difference in the ATT between the two groups is negative. 
N denotes the combined number of matched targets. ***,**,* Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 
10% confidence level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: The impact of acquisitions on acquired firms’ debt ratios; high-income OECD countries 
Panel (a):  Foreign acquisition from high-income OECD countries/ Gearing  
 
Italy Spain 
Year ATT 
 
N ATT 
 
N 
0 -0.802*** (0.204) 118 -0.410 (0.288) 130 
1 -1.028*** (0.200) 105 -0.714** (0.351) 112 
2 -1.196*** (0.236) 94 -1.740*** (0.451) 94 
3 -0.854*** (0.262) 73 -1.718*** (0.557) 63 
Panel (b): Foreign acquisition from high-income OECD countries / LeverageST 
 
Italy Spain 
Year ATT 
 
N ATT 
 
N 
0 -1.266*** (0.450) 126 -0.483 (0.322) 140 
1 -1.952*** (0.489) 105 -1.379*** (0.357) 121 
2 -2.299*** (0.600) 85 -1.959*** (0.464) 84 
3 -1.849*** (0.697) 67 -2.065*** (0.495) 58 
Note: five-nearest neighbor matching. ATT denotes average treatment effect on the treated. N denotes the number of 
matched targets. Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
confidence level, respectively. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Distribution of firms by industry 
 
Italy 
 
Spain 
 
Number of 
Observations 
% of 
total 
 
Number of 
Observations 
% of 
total 
Manufacture of food products  34605 2.79 
 
42246 3.39 
Manufacture of beverages  5742 0.46 
 
8964 0.72 
Manufacture of tobacco products  144 0.01 
 
108 0.01 
Manufacture of textiles  22068 1.78 
 
10125 0.81 
Manufacture of wearing apparel  22545 1.82 
 
8271 0.66 
Manufacture of leather and related products  17568 1.42 
 
7812 0.63 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood  13977 1.13 
 
13590 1.09 
except furniture 
     Manufacture of paper and paper products  10818 0.87 
 
6174 0.50 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media  13554 1.09 
 
14364 1.15 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  1683 0.14 
 
234 0.02 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  17532 1.41 
 
13023 1.05 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 3411 0.27 
 
2448 0.20 
 and pharmaceutical preparations  
     Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  25929 2.09 
 
15246 1.22 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  30726 2.48 
 
24939 2.00 
Manufacture of basic metals  12132 0.98 
 
7254 0.58 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, 91026 7.34 
 
50094 4.02 
 except machinery and equipment  
     Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products  17334 1.40 
 
4797 0.38 
Manufacture of electrical equipment  22023 1.77 
 
7731 0.62 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  62505 5.04 
 
20628 1.66 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  8208 0.66 
 
6840 0.55 
Manufacture of other transport equipment  6759 0.54 
 
2484 0.20 
Manufacture of furniture  22050 1.78 
 
13896 1.12 
Other manufacturing 13968 1.13 
 
5679 0.46 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment  8613 0.69 
 
7182 0.58 
Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles  58365 4.70 
 
56358 4.52 
and motorcycles  
     Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles  246204 19.84 
 
282159 22.64 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles  111501 8.99 
 
118206 9.49 
Land transport and transport via pipelines  35532 2.86 
 
50517 4.05 
Water transport  1710 0.14 
 
1755 0.14 
Air transport  594 0.05 
 
936 0.08 
Warehousing and support activities for transportation  24444 1.97 
 
26640 2.14 
Postal and courier activities  540 0.04 
 
1836 0.15 
Accommodation  25173 2.03 
 
33561 2.69 
Food and beverage service activities  19710 1.59 
 
37737 3.03 
Publishing activities  7488 0.60 
 
7065 0.57 
Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound 
recording and music publishing activities 4410 0.36 
 
5391 0.43 
Programming and broadcasting activities  2763 0.22 
 
2574 0.21 
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Telecommunications  2511 0.20 
 
4977 0.40 
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities  23481 1.89 
 
16632 1.33 
Information service activities  9243 0.74 
 
2142 0.17 
Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding  5346 0.43 
 
11421 0.92 
Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities  5535 0.45 
 
6336 0.51 
Real estate activities  54576 4.40 
 
120087 9.64 
Legal and accounting activities  5922 0.48 
 
16830 1.35 
Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities  20295 1.64 
 
21735 1.74 
Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and 
analysis  15606 1.26 
 
22617 1.81 
Scientific research and development  3060 0.25 
 
1845 0.15 
Advertising and market research  12546 1.01 
 
15462 1.24 
Other professional, scientific and technical activities  7722 0.62 
 
13518 1.08 
Veterinary activities  81 0.01 
 
495 0.04 
Rental and leasing activities  6813 0.55 
 
13284 1.07 
Employment activities  1044 0.08 
 
3303 0.27 
Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation  10224 0.82 
 
7929 0.64 
service and related activities  
     Security and investigation activities  3222 0.26 
 
4014 0.32 
Services to buildings and landscape activities  7623 0.61 
 
19116 1.53 
Office administrative, office support and other business support 
activities  14832 1.20 
 
12213 0.98 
Repair of computers and personal and household goods  3150 0.25 
 
2088 0.17 
Other personal service activities  4779 0.39 
 
11250 0.90 
      
 
 
 
 
Table A.2: Distribution of firms by size class 
 
Italy 
 
Spain 
 
Number of Observations % of total 
 
Number of Observations % of total 
Less than 10 516618 42.80 
 
485586 39.70 
Between 10 and 19 315603 26.15 
 
309168 25.28 
Between 20 and 49 228447 18.93 
 
292446 23.91 
Between 50 and 249 125532 10.40 
 
115155 9.42 
250 and more 20790 1.72 
 
20664 1.69 
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Table A.3: Balancing tests for matched sample 
      Italy  Spain 
   
Mean t-test Mean t-test 
 
Sample 
 
Treated Control |t| p>|t| Treated Control |t| p>|t| 
Foreign acquisition/ Year 0 ln(Productivity) 12.775 12.708 0.57 0.567 12.254 12.231 0.19 0.848 
Gearing  
 
ln(Scale) 3.933 3.796 0.93 0.351 4.098 3.997 0.71 0.480 
  
ln(Age) 2.710 2.713 0.03 0.980 2.832 2.759 0.73 0.467 
  
Ln(K/L) 3.050 3.231 0.92 0.360 2.754 2.648 0.51 0.610 
  
Ln (Gearing) 4.352 4.534 1.12 0.266 2.294 2.804 1.21 0.226 
 
  Ln(Gearing)2 20.782 22.351 1.14 0.253 21.641 18.654 1.30 0.194 
 
Year 1` ln(Productivity) 12.760 12.685 0.63 0.532 12.282 12.270 0.09 0.926 
  
ln(Scale) 3.929 3.791 0.93 0.355 4.134 4.013 0.80 0.423 
  
ln(Age) 2.686 2.725 0.29 0.771 2.864 2.749 0.99 0.322 
  
Ln(K/L) 2.994 3.195 0.96 0.339 2.798 2.760 0.17 0.866 
  
Ln (Gearing) 4.298 4.504 1.19 0.237 2.282 2.732 0.94 0.346 
    Ln(Gearing)2 20.375 22.075 1.17 0.242 23.308 19.832 1.35 0.179 
Domestic acquisition/ Year 0 ln(Productivity) 12.466 12.390 0.81 0.416 11.984 11.998 0.14 0.888 
Gearing  
 
ln(Scale) 3.913 3.821 0.69 0.491 3.641 3.584 0.57 0.567 
  
ln(Age) 2.663 2.695 0.33 0.745 2.603 2.585 0.18 0.854 
  
Ln(K/L) 2.863 2.938 0.43 0.670 3.110 3.167 0.40 0.690 
  
Ln (Gearing) 4.565 4.600 0.27 0.784 2.933 2.616 1.07 0.285 
 
  Ln(Gearing)2 22.548 22.815 0.25 0.805 22.055 21.739 0.19 0.846 
 
Year 1 ln(Productivity) 12.462 12.415 0.48 0.632 11.958 11.980 0.20 0.844 
  
ln(Scale) 3.927 3.816 0.81 0.420 3.655 3.605 0.49 0.621 
  
ln(Age) 2.702 2.754 0.53 0.595 2.599 2.574 0.23 0.815 
  
Ln(K/L) 2.881 2.981 0.54 0.591 3.165 3.165 0.00 0.999 
  
Ln (Gearing) 4.558 4.570 0.09 0.927 2.785 2.629 0.49 0.627 
    Ln(Gearing)2 22.447 22.569 0.11 0.915 22.074 21.473 0.34 0.732 
Foreign acquisition/ Year 0 ln(Productivity) 12.809 12.708 0.89 0.376 12.206 12.185 0.18 0.855 
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LeverageST 
 
ln(Scale) 3.907 3.771 0.95 0.341 4.138 4.012 0.94 0.346 
  
ln(Age) 2.653 2.640 0.10 0.924 2.792 2.715 0.81 0.418 
  
Ln(K/L) 3.070 3.265 1.00 0.316 2.721 2.633 0.41 0.683 
  
Ln (LeverageST) -0.488 -0.671 0.31 0.758 -2.368 -2.760 0.63 0.527 
 
  Ln(LeverageST)2 24.787 27.779 0.79 0.431 37.409 39.933 0.60 0.547 
 
Year 1 ln(Productivity) 12.789 12.665 0.99 0.322 12.245 12.233 0.10 0.918 
  
ln(Scale) 3.987 3.852 0.90 0.371 4.123 4.018 0.74 0.463 
  
ln(Age) 2.640 2.581 0.36 0.720 2.820 2.684 1.31 0.190 
  
Ln(K/L) 3.032 3.272 1.12 0.265 2.790 2.665 0.55 0.585 
  
Ln (LeverageST) -0.635 -0.773 0.21 0.836 -2.733 -3.133 0.59 0.559 
    Ln(LeverageST)2 25.733 28.857 0.74 0.461 38.989 42.629 0.78 0.435 
Domestic acquisition/ Year 0 ln(Productivity) 12.453 12.363 0.98 0.327 11.964 11.959 0.05 0.958 
LeverageST 
 
ln(Scale) 3.967 3.825 1.11 0.266 3.666 3.609 0.62 0.538 
  
ln(Age) 2.663 2.663 0.00 0.999 2.515 2.482 0.32 0.749 
  
Ln(K/L) 2.804 2.961 -0.96 0.339 3.022 2.993 0.22 0.826 
  
Ln (LeverageST) -0.123 -0.629 1.06 0.289 -3.230 -3.578 0.85 0.396 
 
  Ln(LeverageST)2 22.885 27.128 -1.38 0.170 43.299 45.394 -0.75 0.456 
 
Year 1 ln(Productivity) 12.445 12.387 0.58 0.564 11.956 11.982 -0.24 0.808 
  
ln(Scale) 3.981 3.855 0.91 0.361 3.692 3.604 0.84 0.400 
  
ln(Age) 2.670 2.680 -0.09 0.925 2.442 2.474 -0.27 0.790 
  
Ln(K/L) 2.776 2.992 -1.23 0.219 3.053 3.007 0.31 0.754 
  
Ln (LeverageST) -0.291 -0.557 0.50 0.619 -3.859 -4.092 0.50 0.618 
    Ln(LeverageST)2 24.067 26.666 -0.75 0.454 47.829 49.067 -0.39 0.699 
Note: The test examines the balancing hypothesis for all variables included in the propensity score, based on their pre-acquisition values. Year 0 refers to the sample of 
matched targets included in the calculation of the ATT in the year of acquisition, whereas Year 1 refers to the sample of matched targets included in the calculations of the 
ATT in the first year following the acquisition. 
 	
